STÁTNÍ TAJEMNÍK U ŘÍŠSKÉHO PROTEKTORA V ČECHÁCH A NA MORAVĚ, PRAHA, inv. 26, sig. 109-1/29 Page 11 · 11 of 28
STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 26, sig. 109-1/29
English Translation
- 7 - because inspection of the administration is only a part of its area of responsibility according to the original idea. The regular inspection can in turn only be subject to administrative bodies with clear organizational installation, e.g. the president of the state. Logically, in the event of such a restriction of the concept of the Oberlandrat inspectors, the state presidents also strive to turn the inspectors of the Reichsprotector inspectors into the state's presidents. This is only natural and cannot be taken against them. Similarly, the juxtaposition of different specialist administrations, which were formerly united either with the district heads or with the upper regional councils of old, cannot give up the sole provisions of the Oberlandrats, namely that they should resurrect the Upper Regional Councils of old in a slightly changed form, i.e. For example, the following structures are set up: the former heads of the Oberlandrats' departments become independent heads of departments. At the same time, the Oberlandsrats are deprived of the authority over the former head of division and now independent post manager and their powers are limited to allowing them to speak well. Moreover, the Upper Land Councils remain what they have been up to now, namely the immediate and only purely German middle level of administration as subordinate authority to that of the authority of the Reichsprotector. The nonsense of this construction leaps into the eyes. 2.) Universal commissioning. Although the supervision and inspection of the administration and the combination of diverging and co-operating specialist administrations form part of the tasks of the Oberlandrat inspectors, -8