NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 986, sig. 110-9/2 (poškozeno) Page 70 · 70 of 134
Germany'S MINISTRY FOR CHEATURES AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 986, sig. 110-9/2 (damaged)
English Translation
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking the President-in-Office of the Council for his excellent report, and I would like to thank the President of the Commission for his reply. Argentina was the only country in Ibero-america that suffered from no shortages. Even oil and petrol were so abundant that private car traffic was not only fully maintained, but also increased by importing larger quantities of new cars from Brazil and Uruguay. The oil wells in the north of the country apparently provided enough fuel to supply the rapidly expanding industry. With little envy, but also with great respect, the remaining countries of South America looked at Argentina, which seemed not only to have achieved no harm by its opposition to Wa- shington's wishes, but on the contrary to have gained quite extraordinary economic advantages. Buenos Aires became the Mecca of the war-hungry merchants from Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile and even Peru. And Buenos Aires did not reject these buyers, but sold at the most profitable prices many of the goods that the US had promised but never delivered. Particularly favored were Paraguay and Bolivia, which could be supplied with the trans-chaco train without great difficulty. Accordingly, the pressure that the US could exert on these countries lost momentum, and the initial displeasure slowly increased to intense concern. It was obvious that Roosevelt was only waiting for a favourable opportunity to take Argentina into the pliers with all the force of the US power. However, he immediately excluded arbitrariness from the lease and loan law, whereby this country could not obtain weapons from the US. It is likely that, contrary to the plentiful supply of arms to Brazil and Uruguay, the General Staff of Argentina was concerned, but it was said at the time that this question depended more on the person of President Castillo than on the country's overall policy. One cannot spare the Ramirez government the accusation that it has become head of the obvious success of its policy. Ramiriz has been enticed by a number of considerable political successes, including the initiation of negotiations with Chile on a customs union, to recognize the new Bolivian Villaroel government, so to speak, overnight. Whether Ramirez has in any way favored or actively supported the coup d'état Villaroels, Cordell Hull claims, but has not been proved by anything. However, the over-hasty recognition of the new government in the acknowledged interpretation of South American politics in general means that Argentine was most likely involved in the matter. The long-awaited opportunity for Roosevelt had come. The Argentinean government was brief and concisely informed that the time had come to listen to Washington's wishes. What kind of threats Roosevelt had announced has not become known. However, while the Ramirez government met with its ministers, an American squadron under Admiral Graham entered Montevideo with strange suddenness. The Uruguayan government was forced to pull troops together at the Argentine border. It was just by chance that in those days the city of San Juan in the province of Mendoza was almost completely destroyed by an earthquake and that the Argentine government was invited to an evacuation procedure which could only be mastered with difficulty. Admiral Graham told Ramirez that the drugs needed for San Juan would not be made available! In South Brazil, troop movements have also taken place. Four and twenty hours later Ramirez surrendered unconditionally He suddenly discovered an alleged German-Japanese espionage ring, which was allegedly controlled from the embassies. Under this more than flimsy pretext, a policy, like a house of cards, worked together, which, with the lofty words, had spoken of the sacrificial neutrality of the country and of the people, which with great pride had always put out the indomitable will of the Argentine people to depend, and on every occasion had described the other countries of South America as slaves of US imperialism. One last time Ramirez allowed himself a blow against Washington. A telegram from the Argentinean ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, in which he congratulated his president, finally gave rise to the Argentine government's programme, which had come to the helm as a result of Castillo's fall. Ramirez replied to the telegram by rejecting the congratulations as incomprehensible and stressing that the break-up of relations with any country would never have been in a programme of the Argentine government. Clichee - and the Mr Ambassador in Rio thanked. The first consequences of the break-up of relations with the Axis powers were as shameful as they were sobering and strange for Argentina. Shameful and disillusioning, because immediately the petrol ration was immediately applied. Oddly, because strangely, in all Ibero-American countries, the gasoline was only rationed after they had obeyed Washington's orders and had broken relations with the "people of the South American continent." In the case of Argentina, which has its own oil wells, the rationing that has been carried out has nothing to do with the scarcity of raw materials or tankers, but with the explicit order of Washington that Argentina should now also make a sacrifice for the joint war effort, thanks for the demolition, by supplying Uruguay and South Brazil with fuel to the detriment of its own country. It is clear that Argentina will no longer be able to export at its own discretion, but also in this respect it will have to adapt to the Rooseveltian plans of domination in the United States. Washington has won the whole line and struck two birds with one stone, because with the break-up of relations with the Axis powers, Washington has also struck England a heavy blow.