English Translation

231 and never worked in a military association. An offer of the senior officer Schaller, active officer, formerly Ic at Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring, to be used in the combat group as a leader, is rejected by Group-Behrends. The battle plan of the combat group is prepared according to Karl May proposals, as assured by military-professional and folk-deutsçher side. It is forbidden to carry out a sham stuca attack on Temeshburg, which is supposed to be the signal for the Germans in Temeschburg. However, nothing is being done to determine whether the Germans in Temeshburg, after the arrest of their previous leaders, sit or refrain from their own leadership in order to give them a leadership. The attack on Te- meschburg is then launched on the bright day, starting from a tactically very unfavorable terrain; it is particularly criticised that the fighting group of group leaders Behrends is led as if he had an army corps to lead. The head of the combat group is 7o-8o km behind the front, has no telephone or radio connection to his 2 battalions and has to provide this by krad detectors with orders. Since only one krad alarm is available, the one battalion receives the messages later than the other, so that the two battalons compete for battle at different times. The company initially took a very good look at German-Zerne, so that group leader Behrends made a success report to the Reichsführer-SS very quickly. It is later claimed that he had announced the case of Temeschburg over the next 24 hours. However, the action failed completely, as Russians and Romanians soon recognized both the leadership and material weakness of the German fighting group. Bei- de Bataillone suffered the most severe losses. Group leader Behrends blames the shooting of the action on a failure of the people's Germans in Temeshburg who would not have made the expected uprising. Gruppenführer Behrends explains that he wants to pull his fighting group out of the fight. However, a withdrawal of the fighting groups does not take place at first, since the Wehrmacht has the remaining unity. As regards the youth formation of the German team born 1925/26, it is possible to achieve that they are withdrawn into the second line. However, the action Temeschburg has fundamental significance for the development of the evacuation question, since the Reichsführer SS apparently sent a radio message on the basis of the success report of Grüppenführers, in which he ordered that the evacuation of the Romanian Germans should be stopped. The Serbian and Romanian Banats were kept under all circumstances. 10.9.1944 The General Transport intends to release the pontoons seized for the Ponton Bridge near Aradatz. This would have meant that every owner could have picked up his pontoon again. The construction of the bridge would then be impossible. It is necessary to negotiate with various departments on this issue. Dié Kreiskommandantur Betschkerek does not see himself able to do anything in the whole matter. On the same day the Kreis-kommandantur orders the seizure of all cars /cars/ in private place for his own Diewptstelle. This maşnahme is interpreted in such a way that the Kreisekommandorantur for vacuuming their service station 49845