English Translation

24 -2- On the other hand, the SdP. took the view that no more association should dance out of line and in particular the frets bound in international associations and protected by them would have to take action. Unfortunately, due to the negative behaviour of the federal leadership "The Homeland Sons in World War II" it was only very late and almost too late for this operation. The Gaukriegerführer describes the thought of Colonel Tittelbach as correct and considers that "this certainly correct thought of Konrad Henlein has been misinterpreted!" This sentence contains an undue criticism of Konrad Henlein's political judgment. If all the Sudeten German associations had shared the above attitude, it would probably hardly have come to such an exemplary closed commitment under the leadership of Konrad Henlein. That attitude led to the shameful fact that the front fighters= and soldiers' associations were known as the last and not entirely without compulsion, even after the German state officials' associations to Konrad Henlein. The rejection of Oberstlt, led by the Gaukriegerführer. Tittelbach by the Gauleführer refers to my knowledge above all also that Oberstelt. Tittelbach had refused the acquisition of the membership of the SaP until the very last registration period ( lo.5.1938 ) despite repeated invitations and was therefore never a party member, which made my work as commissioner Konrad Henlein more difficult at that time. The chronic = hesitant attitude of the Bundesführer-Bundesführung, its opportunity policy and its commitment to individual fates, even if this endangered the entire federation, led to the most unpleasant kind of confusion: so up to the end of the Czechoslovak CIP committee, a Prague full Jew (Dr.Schwarz) had to appear officially as a representative of the "Deutscher Führerführungsbund" and in Reichenberg the business was led by a pensioner, who was still known as a Schuschnigg follower even after the connection of the Ostmark, but had to have changed in the meantime, since he was taken over by the Gaukriegerfalter as an adjutant etc. Even the reasons for the above-mentioned refusal to keep the front fighter in hand as an effective instrument for the time of the decision proved to be inconceivable at this time of decision. Probably the opposition circles of the "home sons in the world wars" mentioned above acted on their own initiative in the hour of decision-making. I myself took my assignment from Konrad Henlein for the Sudeten-German front fighters in such a way that on 14 September 1938 I left my residence in Prague, hurried to my home country, (SdP-Kreis IV) and there operated the SdP front fighters and, moreover, set up as deputy of the district head and head of the intelligence service of this district, where I can present an expert report from the Consul General Dr. Walter Lierau. In Reichenberg, too, I had to find out that there was no commitment from the leadership of the Front Fighter League, which wanted to keep its front fighters in hand as an effective instrument for the hour of decision. On the contrary, it was only through my instigation that a local operation was carried out, but was so open that the rapidly raised order service flew up within a short period of time.