STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 643, sig. 109-4/391

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English Translation

- 4- Hitler believed a single Vort and had no illusions about the meaning of his signature. I was also convinced that the inevitable end of his regime will be brought about by the war, that the war is inevitable and that only a victorious war could sustain him and his regime. The Csr was aware of this non-existence on the basis of the National Aocialist system and then made demek its plans. Europe, with the exception of Italy (?), thought differently. The Cšr.'s forced victim under these conditions had special significance for Europe and the whole world. Firstly, this victim made it possible for Buropa, and in particular the two great democracies, to prepare for the war. Secondly, it was for Europe and the whole world the last attempt to determine whether a confederation of flour is possible in peace with Nazi Germany, and thirdly, we pay the price for the security of peace, at least for a certain period of time and at least in Western Europe, and so the sacrifice of the CSk removed from the British. World empire, which was not yet prepared for the war in l938, this war by one year. This delay of one year used England to begin intensive military preparations. Riexknkagaxdesxdakrnzxigiaxzaiga The crisis of the year l938 clearly showed the goodwill and determination of the CSr to contribute to the peace of Europe. The low attitude of Nazi Germany caused the public opinion of England to become morally mature, all of which was the first contribution of the GšR to the present war effort, and it was a small contribution, because it meant the sacrifice of the life of our state. If Prague had only behaved passively in September of the year l93e, then Hitler would have started the war at that time. I said then to my generals and political friends: If we want to wage a war, then perhaps we will also bring France to war. But what do we or anyone else win, if rankreich, which does not want to fight, in this war succumb to believe me, to whom I say, that the decision of the Čsk needed more courage and heroism than if I had given the order to attack the attacker. At that historic moment, my army leaders demanded an interview with me as the head of state and the commander-in-chief of the army. They demanded of me that I reject the proposal of the great powers and give the order to take action against any German army that takes possession of any part of the CSR ground. they swore, they threatened, they asked, and some even cried. I told them that I fully remembered my duty to the people, as well as from their side their duties against the army. However, I rejected their proposal, and after stating my reasons for my decision, I ended the conversation with the words: "The real war will come soon. England and France would not fight today, but it is certain that they will have to fight later. Stand firmly in your seats and be prepared, you and your soldiers. The people must endure. Do not give in to whatever happens and wait for the right eyebliek. Then we will go back to war as in years lgl4.! I beg you to understand me correctly. Even then, in 1938, I was firmly convinced that it would be much better for all of us to fight together against the Kational Socialist terror and the dictatorship of Germany. But that the CSR should go to war alone would have been either a state of despair or a futile gesture in September l938 with regard to the political, moral and military situation of Europe at that time. That's why it was then called "keep but stand still" and subject us to the dictates of Munich. I thanked him, prepared everything for the event of war, and went into exile.