English Translation

If Germany were to win the war, Russia would have to defend its rule over the Baltic countries with other weapons, els with the feather. The German-Russian trade agreement provides for Germany to receive from Russia grain, a little solute and little other raw materials, which are so dear to him. Russia, on the other hand, receives machinery to develop its industry and armor. So Russia is getting a mess, because we know that Russia insists very precisely on the delivery train by train and does not engage in credit transactions. Germany can almost not expect oil from Ruseland, because Russia's own consumption always exceeds the production as a result of its mechanization and industrialization. Moreover, the recognition of the delivery of the Baltic Iänder, especially since it was not followed by a recognition of German plans to the Balkans, is a pill on which Germany is difficult to swallow. - President_Eenes and Minister for Foreign Affairs Jan Masaryk last week were ehrcirgiste at an evening organized by the British National Defence Association. The President gave a speech which was very attentive in the British press. Since time does not allow us to bring the entire speech of the President at once, we will return today the first part of the speech and will bring the second part soon: Beneš. "As often as I have been called upon to speak of the teches in the course of this war, I have not been able to avoid the issue of the ENT decision of the great powers in Munich. I do not want to deal with diosic decision, the problems of which have already been resolved by the war events. The events of the falloves were, in fact, of a military nature. On the Seiton, on the Czech side as well as on the German side, had been mobilized, the troops were in readiness, 3 million men were under the weapons, defense, air weapon, everything was ready. The Munich verdict was the dictate of military conditions to a defeated country. The new borders, which were dictated, took away from the country any possibility of military resistance. The decision of the Gsk in March of the following year was the inevitable and expected consequence of the Munich dictatorship, and its case was only the one that preceded the final military action, the formal beginning of the European war, in which a lord began, as it has never been before. I believe that, in the interests of Europe's peace and happiness, the fali of Austria and the CSR should have been prevented under all conditions. I am aware, and I am fully aware of, why France and England, before Munich, demanded of us so large opiers in the interest of Prieden. I know that both Iänder were neither politically nor morally prepared for the war, but especially not from a military point of view. On the other hand, the CSk and Germany were the only countries that were prepared in all respects for the Kricg in the Septenber crisis of 1939. As far as our funds were allowed in the autumn crisis in lg38, we were mobilized and our resources were very important. During the three years of my presidency, after the abdication of President Masaryk, I had concentrated no whole work on defending our state. Three times in the years 1934-1937, like Poland, I was offered a two-page contract with Germany by the GsR. I repeatedly rejected this proposal, pointing out that the CSR without the League of Nations and without the powers with which it had treaties could not do anything. I never had any