STÁTNÍ TAJEMNÍK U ŘÍŠSKÉHO PROTEKTORA V ČECHÁCH A NA MORAVĚ, PRAHA, inv. 246, sig. 109-3/25 Page 30 · 30 of 57
STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 246, sig. 109-3/25
English Translation
\ -8 - Early summer l94o could unnecessarily complicate the political situation on the Finnish issue, in particular by strengthening German-Finnish trade relations. By opening hostilities, Russia has completely eliminated Berlin from the Finnish game. After the impression of the German embassy in Helsinki, this event was as surprising for the AA as it was for everyone else. In any case, it took several days for instructors from Berlin to arrive, who did justice to the changed situation. From this point of view, it remains of minor importance whether Moscow was hoping to end the campaign against Finland within four weeks, or whether it was set up from the outset for a long-term war.The opening of the fir war was undoubtedly a foreign policy success for Moscow. The extent to which this is the case is best illustrated by the following fact: at the beginning of December, the Finnish Government asked Germany to mediate between Helsinki and Moscow in order to resolve hostilities. Finland was prepared to meet the military demands of Mog- kaufermulierend at that time and also offered Germany the unlimited exploitation of the Finnish mining resources, including the currently owned nickel mines of petsamctuturit. The request was answered negatively by the German side. The question of a peace hluse is once again vividly ventilated. According to the undeniable Finnish weapons successes, it is naturally difficult for the Finnish government to reach a peace that demands widespread piaktically renunciation. In Helsinkl it is considered that, apart from the agreement on peace, it is not possible to find an intermediary, and that I personally have the impression that in Finland it is too easy to overestimate the impact of one's own successes on the position of the Soviet Union.