STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 246, sig. 109-3/25

Page 29

English Translation

21 - 7 - to take an inflexible attitude towards the Russian demands in order to arrive at at least during the winter without any significant danger. There was a double deception in this, believing that Russia did not want to go to war with Finland, or, if that were the case, that it would avoid being dragged into a winter war. The evidence that such ideas played a decisive role in the Finnish government is to be seen in the following facts: The Finnish delegation in Moscow, after an agreement could not be reached, stopped the negotiations and went back to Finland on the grounds that it had more important things to do in Helsinki. In Helsinkti. Even the evacuation measures were reversed and the schools were reopened so that the Russian air raid hit a completely unprepared city. The government reshaping immediately after the opening of hostilities was thought to be a good part of a deal with Molotov, who had expressly declared that he could no longer negotiate with the government of Cayander. Finally, the Rytti government tried to stop the Russian Vormarsoh by giving full Naeh. At this time, however, the Soviet Union had already recognized the "people's government" of Kuussin in the villages of Terijoki as a right-wing Finnish government. Thus, a backlash on the original demands for the Soviet union had become impossible. From Helsinki, the observer gets the impression that the Soviet Union had to wage war with Finland as quickly as possible and thus make its indispensable claim: ' to define the whole Finnish territory in time and irrevocably, especially with regard to Berlin. In Moscow, it had to be feared that there would be a shift in the conflict until the end of the century.