NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 122, sig. 110-3/62 Page 115 · 115 of 118
THE GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 122, sig. 110-3/62
English Translation
810 beac-Dape - 2 - SVNALO Mtadaie8aeb taneil OlI. K r o h m e r as his own opinion, that he knows with the best the defenses of the position building and that he must say nevertheless with all skepticism, they are in any case a defense possibility to stop an attacking opponent. This, however, is entirely dependent on whether there are teams and weapons for the occupation and defence of the positions. He had to say that in this respect, especially as the General himself said, he could not have confidence. In circles of the local weapons4, the installation of the fortification lines was regarded as false and indispensable. However, no concrete information was given as to how it would have been more correct and expedient. The statements given by General P o e l are confirmed in a meeting in front of the assembled people's storm leaders from Brno, who were held by the Knight's Cross-bearer Major B l l c h e r in the fortress administration on 2.IV.1945 at 19 o'clock. Blücher emphasized that the people's storm, in particular, would be used to defend the fortress of Brno. Otherwise, the fortress commander would not have sufficient soldiers to defend Brno. The three Brünn Volkssturm battalions were intended to occupy the entire defense system in case of emergency. When the Volkssturmführer asked for weapons and ammunition, Blücher had to admit that the fortress of Brno had almost no heavy weapons at all, no machine weapons and few rifles anymore. The weapons used so far in the popular-storm training had been given to the Wehrmacht units that had left the front. Only ammunition for the smaller calibres is available in sufficient quantity. The supply of armored barrel amounts a little more than three railway wagons. The president of the state, four-story leader Dr. Sc h w a b e , expressed the following on questions: He considered the designation of Brno as a fortress to be uttered nonsense. Either a city from before was a fortress, but it could not be made later.-Browns lack enough water, for example. The large population makes a functionian as a fortress un-possible. The question of evacuation of the city is a mirror fight. One cannot evacuate, because one does not know where to go with the population. The military value of the fortress of Brno is therefore rather illusory. If the Czechs could not be brought out of Brno, they were a constant threat to the fortress. The same applies if they were evacuated after the vicinity of Brno. In the case of the fortresses it had always been decisive that the German troops could not be brought in before the Russian was there. Police president Dr. H e r m a n and his deputy 79069