NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 757, sig. 110-5/47 Page 50 · 50 of 255
GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 757, sig. 110-5/47
English Translation
- 9 - 41 a clear consolidation of Národná Rada's sphere of power. The interventions in its area of responsibility, which included the K.Z., became less frequent and finally ceased completely. The N.R.'s organs became self-conscious and were able to assert themselves. Only in the days of disintegration under the pressure of the military struggles could a temporary increase in the influence of the power of the other side be observed. From the predicted already clear enough shows that one of the main weaknesses of the insurgency movement was its sociological and programmatic inconsistency from the outset. A common positive goal was actually not at all present; in common, both groups were only the negation of the existing, the dissatisfaction. The reasons for this in the leadership group of the non-Arrived were already explained at the beginning, as far as serious bearers of a positive insurgency were present on the prole- tarian side, the motive for their attitude would be a rebellion against the social injustice, which was mentioned in wide circles of the population as characteristic of the Slovak state system, especially symptomatic to me was the passionate manifestation of a fellow prisoner, who had held a very high rank of state and at that moment certainly spoke from an honest heart: he distinguished the Slovak State in very little flattering images as persuasive of massless corruption and ruthless clique economy. This would not only have led to the usual abuse of state authority (e.g. the displacement of private and business opponents in the notorious K.Z. of Illava), but above all in the economic sector also prevented a -7-