NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 757, sig. 110-5/47 Page 137 · 137 of 255
GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 757, sig. 110-5/47
English Translation
2.2T consistently strongly criticised anti-Czech propaganda in Slovakia. From conversations with relevant figures, including from Slo-Wak government circles, the chief leaders believed that the majority of the responsibility for the outbreak of the uprising was not with the Czechs, as this propaganda claims, but was due to the inability of the Slovak government. An impossible social policy embittered a large part of the civil servants and officers, who in turn promised a change of circumstances by a coup. This favorable soil was skillfully exploited by Benesh propaganda and, above all, by the Soviet emissaries. It is even claimed that members of the Slovak government were allowed to support the insurgency movement, if not supported. Further information could not unfortunately be determined. Werner's remark seems remarkable: "I know Slovakia very well from earlier times. But I have to say that the two peoples have moved so far from each other since March l939 that Slovakia, as a foreign country and the Slovaks, now seems to me to be a completely foreign nation. The whole of Slovakia is nothing other than a preserved Czechoslovakia, with all the evils of democracy, but with an authoritarian painting of leadership." The attitude of the participants can be seen that, despite their different, self-willed personalities, all endeavoured to meet the requirements set by me and to form a single command as possible. It seems to me that it is important to note the problems with the German ethnic groups (although I had only a few possibilities of contact).The ethnic group leadership does not seem to have understood the position of the Germans in Slovakia, which is so important for a German ethnic group abroad. Rather, it seems that only the external manifestations of the NSDAP were transferred to the ethnic group and otherwise nothing was done for the spiritual orientation or for the security of the ethnic groups. If, as is generally claimed, the first threatening signs of an insurrection in Slovakia were already established in June, and primarily German people fell victim to the gang malady, then certain preventive measures could have been taken at that time to ensure that the members of the ethnic group*. Now also with most members of the ethnic group as a further consequence of the immediate horrors she has experienced, an absolute absence of the mood can be observed, which even leads to the fact that individual people's Germans, as required, claim to be Slovaks or Germans. As an example, the priest Bös (not exactly known as the spelling of the name) from Glaserhau or Krickerhau, who in conversation with German journalists and PK-men pretended to be German, while he told Slovaks and Czechs that he was a pure Slovak. This pastor, however, had the particularly tragic experience, as the only living person from a mass grave in which he was thrown as supposed dead, to escape after appalling hours of horror. Time and again one stumbles upon a completely resigned attitude among the people Germans in all areas of Slovakia affected by our intervention group. The German embassy in Pressburg seems to have had either a very small or no influence on the Slovak state leadership, which is all the more surprising since it is my own experience that it will require intensive and thorough political construction work in order to give the ethnic group back self-confidence and confidence in the leadership.