Protektorát Čechy a Morava: právo nástroj nacistické expanze Page 45 · 45 of 289
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia: right tool of Nazi expansion
Franz Josef Otto Felix Maria
1952 CZERNIN 3
Philipp Felix Franz Peter
1979 CZERNIN 3
Julius Maximilian Franz Josef
1983 CZERNIN 3
Peter Alfred Wolfgang Franz Maria
1953 CZERNIN 3
Hubertus Alexander Felix Franz Maria
1956 CZERNIN 3
Wolfgang Leopold Maria Franz
1995 CZERNIN 3
Leo Santiago Franz
1989 CZERNIN 2
Thomas Maria Franz
1966 CZERNIN 2
English Translation
45 took over the Versailles Peace Conference, the Sudeten Germans before Munich so offended. Plans for the direct integration of the Protectorate into the empire or its division concerned especially German protectorate representatives, who saw in these plans a threat to their acquired positions and were interested in preserving the status quo. As the division projects expanded, Neurath and Frank considered it necessary to request support in Berlin. Each sent a memorandum to the Chancellorship, which was to be presented to Hitler. (60) Both documents differed in what they emphasized: Neurathe was putting the advantages of the current regime in the forefront, while Frank devoted more places to ethnic transformation of Bohemia and Moravia. However, both agreed that Germanization of the country is the most appropriate maximum objective. A significant feature of both memoranda was their cynicality, which in Frank's case did not surprise, but indeed shocked the traditionally moderated Neuratha. Neurath vaguely referred to her expulsion (Abstossen) without specifying what he had in mind. Frank recommended special treatment (Sonderbehandlung), which he understood as a complete physical liquidation. ((61) Both authors concluded that most Czechs can be assimilated because they are racially close to the Germans. The abolition of the Protectorate would make it more difficult for now than it would have made it easier, because the division into several counties would have complicated a unified policy. Moreover, separation would have intensified Czech nationalism and aroused a desire for reunification. But it didn't take too long and occupation policy instead of cynical reflections on how to deal with the space of Bohemia and Moravia in the future and what to do with the Czech nation had to focus on much more urgent tasks About the complete extraction of the economic potential of the Protectorate and the implementation of the administrative reform, which should have brought © in addition to the personnel savings © mainly undermining the protectorate autonomy, even if maintaining the external facade. The reasons for this time-departmented turnaround were well summarized by K.H. Frank when he said that after the battle of Moscow, when the Nazis suffered the first serious defeat, there was a review of political strategy and tactics in the Protectorate.