STÁTNÍ TAJEMNÍK U ŘÍŠSKÉHO PROTEKTORA V ČECHÁCH A NA MORAVĚ, PRAHA, inv. 1795, sig. 109-5/23 Page 46 · 46 of 157
STATE SECRETARY TO THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 1795, sig. 109-5/23
English Translation
A234S is to carry it out without invoking a conflict with Russia, Hitler is counted as a great political achievement. It is different with the attitude towards the further treatment of the Polish question. Large annexations at the expense of formerly Polish territory are very controversial in their value in Germany. They wanted to have Upper Silesia back and they wanted to get rid of the corridor. To be burdened with a new large Polish minority, at most the East-Elbian circles have interest in this. In the circles of industrialists, one would prefer a solution that more or less restores independence to core poles, but leaves Poland's economic development to the German economy as a monopoly, i.e. a system similar to that which is basically intended for the South-East European countries. The fact that there was a war with the Western powers because of the Polish question is not so much accused of Hitler as a mistake as one could expect in general. Although strong forces were always alive in German industry, which wanted to come to a German-French understanding, and finally also to an understanding with England. These forces are still present today and even more influential than they used to be. The regime's propaganda directed unilaterally towards England is partly due to this. The confrontation with England has long been accepted as inevitable. Therefore, formerly leading military circles have always insisted on establishing a good relationship with Russia. Now that Hitler has concluded the German-Russian pact, these circles see in the war against England only an inevitable stage of further development, which sooner or later should have come. As far as a criticism of Hitler's politics is being voiced in this context, it is rather in the direction that he has made the German/Russian understanding too late. It has to be noted, however, that there has never been a unified view of the German military, and even today there is no. The group of frondierending genes, which was cold on 4 February 1938, demanded at that time precisely the understanding with Russia. It has not given up its opposition even now. Hitler has forgotten to tie the younger generation of officers firmly to his regime by extremely fast promotion. The cold generals, who to some extent represent the old Schleicher circle, see ever lower chances of asserting themselves again and can therefore no longer