STÁTNÍ TAJEMNÍK U ŘÍŠSKÉHO PROTEKTORA V ČECHÁCH A NA MORAVĚ, PRAHA, inv. 1269, sig. 109-4/1023 (poškozeno) Page 26 · 26 of 55
STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 1269, sig. 109-4/1023 (damaged)
English Translation
15 42 contained only the command to be used in the alert and raised. The obligation to immediately implement an alarm command in all deployment plans of the CP-L and Stapo-L posts with areas included in the large-scale search, beyond the border, within the scope of this action, is reiterated. In order to clear these misunderstandings to fugitive officers the success of their escape to the belated, is in Blitz-FS No. 2373 of 7. 3, which contained an Erledi operation of the large-scale search forces in some western and southerly reports, was expressly referred to the decree of 28 September of the Reich. 42. In most of the search rooms, the called forces and auxiliary forces expressed in various reports, with the necessary speed and view, have been available in sufficient numbers, not at the same time in the entire Reich area, the Protectorate, the General Government and the adjacent areas IX. The following points of view have to be emphasized: 1. The re-appropriation of the fleeting pilot officers was 1) The equipment of the auxiliary forces is of considerable importance, since the enemy is just a wish. This is particularly true with regard to their tested aircraft pilots has a sensitive lack. In addition, the equipment with flashlights and winks confirmed the assumption that the war staffs. Also, fuel has been only to a small extent trapped among themselves for this escape, similar as in the case. In so far as these deficiencies are centrally to remedy other cases, the most able and the most fit, this will have been strengthened in cooperation with the main office, which would have happened on successful escape the enemy air force order police. It has proved necessary in many places that the 2. The escaped had a considerable temporary auxiliary staff living rooms for the time of the replacement and jumped, which were already provided with food when the search stage Beta was triggered. For this by the KPStelle Hohensalza was 10 to 12 hours. must be within the framework of the local deployment places provisions It could therefore be done in the midday hours of the 6th 3. A large part of the fugitives up to far into the Reich- 2) The investigational training of many auxiliary personnel and have been forced. Thus the fleeting pilot captain even of police forces and the information about the Ste v ens after a walk of 25 km already around concrete search order are often exceedingly inadequate 4.40 o'clock Bromberg with a passenger train, which was at 2.11 o' clock, thus even before the dispatch of the large one. It is particularly regrettable that the RKPA's telex, which triggers an investigation, was also sent to Berlin by security police officers on the subject of war. If St e v e n s had not been given in pretentious instructions and had the instructions given in the "Security Committee for 6 hours in Berlin, in special editions of the DtKPBl, it would have been possible for him not to advance far to West or South Germany in the course of the 6. 3. published references to forgery of identity documents. The officers of the police, as far as they are concerned 3. Furthermore, after previous incidents did not have to be in the individual service, the corresponding ones were missing, that also the aeronautical knowledge emanated from old burgundy completely. Contrary to the explicit order officers would make an attempt to possess themselves in the war investigation decree, the auxiliary forces were in many places not to put German planes. That this intention existed to instruct accordingly. This has been demonstrated by the fact that in the case of several retakes, this has resulted in the very frequent execution of drawings of the switchboard systems of German aircraft on a very superficial basis. Several have been found. Similarly, the fugitives who had been taken had to state that they would be able to show their documents, that those who were fleeing had repeatedly presented the Reichsbahn documents uncontested and that they had taken possession of motor vehicles. At present, the control bodies, including those who would be in, had at least one. It was not even the difficulties associated with the mass deployment of auxiliary personnel from war, which were shown to them in cellophane shells, that were not recognized at all, but had to be taken out with the little transparent shells. 3) Although the question of the control authority of the police Even in future cases, it will not be possible to eliminate the triggering of the members of the Wehrmacht in the final investigation stage.The opinion expressed in several cases can nevertheless be based on the control of Wehrmascht reports. That a member of more than 48 hours, especially in the context of a large-scale investigation, of the auxiliary staff is not to be held responsible and will not be waived. Opposition, the above mentioned er- The fact that a number of military commanders are to be opposed. The reports on the search results achieved have already been taken into account, and the accuracy of the RKPA has been deliberately kept brief. Moreover, these places have been communicated only in cases where the question in the "General Army Communications" of 22 June had already covered larger distances, in order to stop the search forces in the areas from the place of escape in 1942 under paragraph 519 (keyword: paybooks) as follows: ..5. Compulsory to show. The paybook is superior and other references to escape methods and the circumstances of the higher rank, also guards, patrols, train re-appropriation have not been communicated in order to prevent, controls and posts of the Wehrmacht and police- that certain search measures behind others, which were so important after and gendarmerie officers upon request, show, for example, that correct determination of the person and became. The local triggering of the large-scale investigation has been repeatedly delayed by technical flaws. As far as these are concerned, it appears that only the ignorance of this order must be stopped in the case of technical measures, the necessary various services of the Wehrmacht and Wehrmascht have been initiated. It is expected that the local authorities will have refused to identify themselves. In the case of telex vehicles, the military or police identification numbers and the police command points — which were thoroughly marked or posted, are very often of the blocking