STÁTNÍ TAJEMNÍK U ŘÍŠSKÉHO PROTEKTORA V ČECHÁCH A NA MORAVĚ, PRAHA, inv. 481, sig. 109-4/227 Page 84 · 84 of 91
STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 481, sig. 109-4227
English Translation
45a - 34 - Unit of Dr. Benesch's various applications, which had no great value. There was only one complete chas everywhere. The government accepted all applications and ultimatums without regard to the constitution or overhautp for anything else. Dr. Benesch lectured, communicated the contents of his letter to the Polish presidete, as well as the content of his discussions with the gesaméean. But Irgmmsonkrete requests he did not usually make, however, he decided sovereignly. At that time the situation was really catastophal and pessimistic for all participants and their mood. Septemberxiehxwekss not sure whether there is a war coming to noeh. b If the Soviets had then agreed to their help, it would have come to war in my opinion. In my opinion, Dr. Benesch would have gone to war under the approval of the socialist party in this case, also against the possible resistance of some victims. Lailt sn. At my direct request, Dr. Benesh's conclusion of the negotiations with the Soviets was that, in the event that we go to war, the soviets would grant their "determined" aid, including, in particular, the granting of aid to refugees. He added that further negotiations would be conducted with the soviets. From this communication, I and my friends had the impression that the Soviets did not want to go to war, but that they would like to support the Czechoslovaks in the event of war in the same way as they did in Spain during the Birger war. In one of the most important conferences (on 29 or 30 September) / the morning at Dr. Benesch took place in the presence of the members of the former political cabinet and the party leaders, was dealt with the final decision of whether to accept or reject the English ballots, whereby the rejection would have meant war. The Deputy Prime Minister Hechtnger then considered that Czechoslovakia's entry into the war would sooner or later "reintegrate" the other states into a war and that the Czech affair would end well in the general European context.