NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 717, sig. 110-5/6 Page 30 · 30 of 79
GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 717, sig. 110-5/6
English Translation
22 -6 - Szalasi and his party may confine themselves only to the intensification of the defense and to the securing of the supply, is of course a rather stupid phrase in the given situation. In a country whose leading upper class, from the Reichsverveser to the administrative offices to the general directors of banks and enterprises, is at least with one leg in the enemy camp, a personnel cleaning must of course be carried out, if at all the conditions for a change are to be created, the personnel changes carried out so far in the economy have not been given by the party, are quite limited. The leadership of the party seems to be aware that it lacks the forces for radical changes and that general measures cannot be implemented today. The relationship between the German envoy and the envoys of the Reich, the economic representative and their apparatuses with the relevant Hungarian ministries and administrative offices is too unclear that a clear and strong German leadership would assert itself in all areas. In the current situation, however, such a clear and fast-responsive leadership is absolutely necessary. In the vicinity of Mr Veesenmaier it is also openly admitted that just as in mid-March the opportunities offered at that time were not used and also the possibilities given after Horthy's departure were not perceived in the necessary broad form. One speaks of a failure of Veesenmaier, who had fallen back into his old political game after the days of his personal and undoubtedly decisive commitment. It is clear in these circles that a successful leadership would only have been possible, especially in the augmenblicklich situation, if an analogous solution, such as in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, had been brought about, because with the extreme chauvinist