English Translation

PragueEvening 30. IX.1943. Forgotten knowledge of Der Neue Tag brought an article written by K. H. Frank, under the heading and out of which we bring a substantial part: When in the full summer of 1938 as one of the speakers of the Sudeton German Party, I explained to Lord Runciman the sudeto- the German view of the Czech-Slovak state problem, his answer, as I expected, was diplomatically veiled. Only the fact that the British statesman, no matter how his official mission was defined, was quickly sent out as an observer and mediator to a Central European state, whose 20-year political development has now clearly shown the world's eyes as it was from the outset: as a scene of constant disputes of the people - the inhabitants of it, which were united only in the negation of the state. The exceptionalness of Runciman's mission was merely an expression of the state's exceptional situation. If I am rejuvenating such memories now, just these days, it is not because we may be seeking support from the enemies of the powers for our political views - on- the synonymously socialist state leadership will prove the accuracy of these opinions, and the German sword will never again tolerate the affiliation of Bohemia and Moravia to Rishi being changed. I would like to write that the current hostile promotional theses, which are made from purely purposeful - especially when their political nonsense has practically been proven in the past - can not be a programme for the new European order. From the beginning, not those who warned, nor in Great Britain, and who in the Czech-Slovakia with its rūzné nation - the tribes saw only new smaller Austria-Hungary, but without its massive historical clips. Even one of the committees of the Versailles Conference in the report on the Czech-Slovakia Sudeten-German issue called the state's fundamental problem and added prophetically that this problem will probably become a question of life for the new state, whether it will succeed in obtaining Germans as voluntary citizens. In the course of 20 years, he saw the world more clearly and more clearly that the ruling Czech circle did not heed this warning that it had not only not received Germans, but made them the most outraged opponents of this state. However, it also became equally known that the Sudeton German question was the first but not the only part of the Czech-Slovak state problem. In addition to other national issues, it was above all the ever-increasing excruciation of the Slovak nation, which this state, which was based on fiction united with the Czech-Slovak people, also pushed from this side into total crisis. This created knowledge, common to all those who were not blind to the fact that the Czech-Slovakia was flawedly founded in its construction, that it was sick from the root and that therefore it had to suffer from fundamental state crisis. The basis of the state crisis was, as already said, the state's membership, staggering interests and the tendency of its numerous nationalities. But full of sharpness was achieved only by an absolute political incompetence, indubitability and chauvinism of the ruling push-ups. One of the main causes of this bureaucracy was the international allied policy of the state and on it the reclining dog-matrical virus that France and then England will be able to march automatically behind the Czech-Slovakia, if a button is pressed at Prague Castle. It is this complex of unsustainable internal national-political conditions and foreign-political tension that has called international public mining to the collaborating ground. In the last radē and as decisively as possible in the countries that were supposedly supposed to guarantee with mathematical certainty the integrity of the internal politically-morning Czech-Slovakia. From France, there were more decisive voices, which were heated to fight for the Czechs (with the battre pour les Tchèques) and what was more unanimous, it was believed that it was possible to reasonably guarantee the political state only if it proved that it is about p en ¿liveta and that life is worthy. It would be easy to rely on a large number of votes that clearly demonstrate that the discreet circles in England fully understood the nature of the Czech-Slovak statenf problem and understood the urgency of radical solutions. The official final report by Runci-manov, which finally reached far-reaching support for the German opinion, is of particular importance. He acknowledged that the overall activity of Czech politics was to push the Sudeten Germans into a revolt. He called the Sudeten German hope to help their relatives and their desire to be attached to the Reich as a natural development under these circumstances, and finally recommended, in view of this clear will of the people, that it be carried out by an unforgivable and drastic action. It was clear to the critical observer of the politician of the then head of state what her last intentions were for: to war. Therefore, in the summer of 1938, I also assumed responsibility, in some parallel negotiations between our delegation and the government, which seemed to have had a successful run, to show the public the reality of the situation and its background. Full proof of the final intentions of the Prague Castle was given by mobilization in May 1938, which followed the eil's early diplomatic maneuvers to provoke and humiliate Risa. From this moment came the Sudeten German question directly of international interest, for now Risa - just as planned by Prague - entered into the game. So this only seemingly clever, but in fact, the crooked diplomacy brought Rishi into conflict about the Czech-Slovakia region, and it was by doing so that she was given the post-lithical right, which according to the literature tried to deny her. It was Prague's foreign policy, which, on the one hand, in the hope that Rishi would be intimidated, with the intention of moving the mechanics of allied commitments, was the first to throw military power resources into the fold. The conference was nothing more than the implementation of this unanimous European opinion on the unsustainableness of the Czech-Slovakia and on total indiscretion, the Czech - Slovak Republic still want to keep the force strong. It was this mature and deepened post-knowledge of the European public domain, which formally valid Franco-Czech-Slovak Allied Treaty removed the force and morally and politically made it a dead letter. Thus, the breeding convention was to a certain extent only a political and internationally legally sealed judgment, which existed in the public Minenf of Europe on the Czech-Slavic state problem. On 4 October 1938, the magazine Times recalled this point after the Munich Convention: "The Czech-Slovak state took on its colluding policy from which it was born. It would never have survived the war and its demise without real war occurred automatically. He was sentenced to extinction when his greatest minority received sufficient support from the outside.© The journal © Times goes on: ©Between 1919 and 1935, there was not a single liberal or Labourer with respect to himself who, like most Englishmen, was defamatory to the politics on which the multinational state of Czechoslovakia was built as useless and even immoral. © If they are now preparing in London for for forgetting these knowledge and judgements to which they had then grown up and leaving the full course of cheap agitation of the emigrant handle, then the correctness of those judgments was removed by the non-nf as much as the argument drawn after the beginning of the war that it was not valid after the establishment of the Tectorate. Establishment of the Protectorate wasc (Continued on page 2.)