English Translation

1a if he wrote that the Czechs could do with 1938, which by simultaneous diplo- to the Germans, what they wanted, because matic maneuvers were necessary as a challenge and the Western powers, were designed out of their own humiliation of the empire. Of interest, with them had to go. Just then, the sudeten-German question received this falsification of untenable internal immediately international character, since now nationality political relations and the empire - precisely according to the intentions of foreign policy tension has the inter-Prague itself - came into play. However, in national public opinion on the plan of other than the hoped-for way. Thus, this called. Last but not least, and most decisively, only seemingly clever, in reality, in the countries that supposedly with math-overwhelming diplomacy the empire in thematic security should bring in the integrity of the internal dispute over the Czecho-Slovakia politically fervent Czechoslovakia mili- klei and for this they should guarantee him just tarishly. From France the political authority which came more and more decisively the voices which they denied him in a letter indignantly refused to "seek for the Chechnya. It was Prague's foreign policy to beat the chen" (se battre pour les, on the one hand, in the hope of incorporating the empire into the Tchèques), and it became more and more unanimous on the other hand, with the intention of creating a political state of mechanics of alliance obligations, one could only reasonably bring roles into it, first the military guarantee, if he was capable and worth living as a means of life in the struggle. It would be easy to find a considerable number of healthy European opinion which has been led by voices who clearly demonstrate that they have consistently resisted. The clear circles in England, the natural conference, had now understood nothing more than the Czechoslovak state problem of the implementation of this unanimous European and understood the urgent opinion on the untenability of a radical solution. I Czecho-Slovakia and about the perfect need only of the sensational reluctance to still want to maintain it by force by Professor Toynbee in the "Economist". Precisely these mature and to remember. The invariably opposed voices deepened knowledge of the European public W. Steeds and Seton-Watons are in view of their opinion, which took the force out of the formal French - cschecho - slovaki - "foundation" of their production in the Basic Treaty of the Union, and made him less important in his checks from Benesch's Reptile Fund morally and politically to the dead letter. Thus the Munich Agreement was the official final rapport of Runcimans, which, in a sense, only achieved the political and ethnic endowment of the legal seal in the public of the German point of view. He accepted Europe's opinion on this that the overall effect of the Czechoslovak state problem. This Czech policy called the Sudeten-Germanism facts the "Times" on 4. October "inescapably in the direction of revolt" in 1938 — that is, after the Munich agreement, he called the sudeten - with the following sentences in memory: "The German "hope for the help of their blood relatives and their desire to be attached to the kingdom of Czechoslovak state is underlying, as among these qangen with the collapse of the politics from which he was born. He would never have circumstances natural development", and he finally recommended that, given this clear a war survived, and his demise of popular will his execution in a without real war took place automatically. "Unremained and drastic action". He was destined to be a sub-qanq when his largest minority found sufficient support from just this ever-increasing outside." The "Times" continues, with voices to the Praguens stiffening that the Czech-Slovakia always active Be- Castle. It was not only with the closed fiont of nationalities within the anti-revision system, but also with the progressive, a permanent obstacle to a real natural grouping of Central Europe, in order to contrast and revision-decided elements of foreign countries. The more the untenable then literally continue: "Between 1919 and 1935, there was no liberal or reassurance of the Czecho-Slovak state emerged, the more Labourmann was stiffened with respect for himself, who was on the letter of the obligation. It was not, like most English, the politics for the critical observer of the politics of being branded as useless, even immoral, on then head of state clear, whereupon the multi-ethnic state Czecho-Slovakia ran out of its last intentions: on which was built." War. That is why, in the summer of 1938, when today in London I am given the responsibility of pretending to have forgotten certain moments of seeming to prosper and allowing the cheap negotiations between the agitation of the emigrants' circles to run full course of our delegation and the government, this eliminates their correctness as well- public opinion on the real situation and their little as the background to it only after the beginning of the war. The completed arqument, since the protectorate-proof of the last intentions of the Pragues did not apply any more. The castle was built by the mobilization in May direction of the protectorates on the one hand