STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 2562, sig. 109-12/12209

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English Translation

16a if he wrote that the Czechs could do with 1938, which by simultaneous diplo- to the Germans, what they wanted, because matic maneuvers were necessary as a challenge and the Western powers, were designed out of their own humiliation of the empire. Of interest, must go with them. Just then, the sudeten-German question received this falsification of untenable internal immediately international character, since now nationality political relations and the empire - precisely according to the intentions of foreign policy tension has the inter-Prague itself - came into play. However, in national public opinion on the plan of other than the hoped-for way. Thus, this called. Last but not least, and most decisively, only seemingly clever, in reality, in the countries that supposedly with math-overwhelming diplomacy the empire in thematic security should bring in the integrity of the internal dispute over the Czecho-Slovakia politically fervent Czechoslovakia mili- klei and for this they should guarantee him just tarishly. From France the political authority which came more and more decisively the voices which they denied him in a letter indignantly refused to "seek for the Chechnya. It was Prague's foreign policy to beat the chen" (se battre pour les, on the one hand, in the hope of incorporating the empire into the Tchèques), and it became more and more unanimous on the other hand, with the intention of creating a political state of mechanics of alliance commitments, one could only reasonably assume roles, first of all the military, if he was capable and worth living as a means of life-ens power in the struggle. It would be easy to find a considerable number of healthy European opinion which has been led by voices who clearly demonstrate that they have consistently resisted. The clear circles in England, the natural conference, had now understood nothing more than the Czechoslovak state problem of the implementation of this unanimous European and understood the urgent opinion on the untenability of a radical solution. I Czecho-Slovakia and about the perfect need only of the sensational reluctance to still want to maintain it by force by Professor Toynbee in the "Economist". Precisely these mature and to remember. The invariably opposed voices deepened knowledge of the European public W. Steeds and Seton-Watons are in view of their opinion, which took the force out of the formal French - cschecho - slovaki - "foundation" of their production in the Basic Treaty of the Union, and made him less important in his checks from Benesch's Reptile Fund morally and politically to the dead letter. Thus the Munich Agreement was the official final rapport of Runcimans, who finally reached, to a large extent, the political and ethnic legal seal of the opinion of Europe existing in the public of the German point of view. He recognized that the overall effect of the Czecho-Slovak state problem. This Czech policy called the Sudeten-Germanism facts the "Times" on 4. October "inescapably in the direction of revolt" in 1938 — that is to say after the Munich agreement, he referred to the sudeten — with the following sentences in memory: "The German "hope for the help of their blood-Czech-Slovak state is underlying related and their desire to be connected to the empire as under these qangen with the collapse of politics, circumstances natural development", and he from which he was born. He would never have recommended that a war would have survived in the face of this clear one, and his demise of the people's will was carried out automatically in a war without real war. He was destined to perish when his "unremained and drastic action". The largest minority found sufficient support for Just these ever-increasing voices to the outside of Prague." The "Times" continues that the Czecho-Slovakia is always active Be- Castle. It was thus not only with the closed front of nationalities within the anti-revision system of interior, but also with the progressive, a permanent obstacle to a real and revision-decided elements of the natural grouping of Central Europe, in contrast to foreign countries. The more the inconsistency then literally continues: "Between 1919 and 1935 there was no liberal or prominence, the more Labourmann was stiffened with respect for himself, who was on the letter of commitment. It was not, like most English, clear the politics for the critical observer of the politics of being useless, even immorally branded, on then head of state, whereupon the multi-ethnic state Czecho-Slovakia ran out of its last intentions: on which was built.' War. That is why, in the summer of 1938, when today in London I am given the responsibility of pretending to have forgotten certain moments of seeming to prosper and allowing the cheap negotiations between the agitation of the emigrants' circles to run full course of our delegation and the government, this eliminates their correctness as well- public opinion on the real situation and their little as the background to it only after the beginning of the war. The completed argument, since the protectorate's proof of the last intentions of the Pragueers, did not apply any more. The castle was built by the mobilization in May direction of the protectorates, on the one hand,