STATE SECRETARY FOR THE RUSSIAN PROTECTOR IN THINGS AND IN MORAVA, PRAGUE, inv. 2619, sig. 109-12/267

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English Translation

25 - 7 - the last sanction was needed, but also ran through his hands at the stage of processing. Beneš's profile was already so clearly outlined at that time that there was never any doubt from our side. Under his leadership, an economic balance within the framework of the state was simply not possible because, in our opinion, the decisive partner on the other side simply did not want a real balance at all, without the German Reich throwing its weight into the game, it was not possible to think of an internal political change for the Sudetenuts. II. This view, therefore, was in favour of my personal assessment of the national negotiations at that time, but if, at this point in time, reference was made to political conclusions on Beneš's last objectives, we are now in a position to offer direct proof of this view. And this has been delivered in Dr. Beneš's publications, which have been published in the meantime, most surprisingly. This urge to expose itself, which was already severely rebuked by the Czech side on the occasion of the publication of his World War II memories, has obviously not yet settled down. And so we think of a series of extremely important confessions, unbelievably in the middle of a struggle that has undergone dramatic changes, which is by no means at its end and therefore does not exclude further changes. This unveiling of his strategy and tactics, of his last intentions, he delivers above all in the first part of his writing "Two Years of World War II". I want to summarize in the following the points in question in conjunction with their unchanged wording. They constitute as irrefutable a legal production of the Sudeten-German line in the state crisis of l938 as they irrefutably bear witness to the true culprits of this terrible war. Thus, they are an undeniable finger for the historical lightening of the