NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 367, sig. 110-4/213 Page 39 · 39 of 57
GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 367, sig. 110-4213
English Translation
questioning Martin about this, I managed to put things in the right light and even convince him of the vileness of the enemy propaganda, which evaluates such unsuitable objects because of the lack of better starting points. In my explanations, I was able to repeatedly draw on experiences from my stay abroad, so that my representations had the objectivity that Martin - as he expressed himself - had often missed so far in attempts to teach him a better one. In addition, Martin has a sense of wit and sarcasm, which has helped over some cliffs.My explanations moved with regard to Martin's attitude in the following big lines: 1./ I put a heavy emphasis on the presentation of the Soviet Russian danger (about which Martin knew the least). I have made it clear to him that a German situation would mean a systematic Bolshevization of the whole of Europe and the end of the European cult (with the United States as helpers) and the naivety of the assumption that a peaceful detachment of the Soviet Russians by US troops could take place. Martin, on the other hand, continues to insist on the possibility that US troops could still occupy Central Europe before the Soviet Russians. Jokingly, he said that he himself would provide our protection in Prague in good time. 2./ Despite his bias against Germany, I found Martin a certain open-mindedness for the presentation of the empire as the only possible power of inquiry in Europe. Arguments that the realm for this task does not look back on a sufficient experience or tradition, but that nations as well as people with their tasks awake, further references to the history of the construction of the British empire were shining for Martin. He even went so far as to acknowledge that the Germans are more dignified today than two years ago.