GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 367, sig. 110-4213

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English Translation

questioning Martin about this, I managed to put things in the right light and even convince him of the vileness of the enemy propaganda, which evaluates such unsuitable objects because of the lack of better starting points. In my explanation, I was able to draw on experiences from no stay abroad again and again, so that my depictions were of the same objectivity that Martin - as he himself expressed himself - had often missed in the attempts made by others to teach him a better one. Furthermore, Martin has a sense of wit and sarcasm, which has helped over some cliffs. My explanations moved with regard to Martin's attitude in the following big lines: l./ I have this. Heavy on the presentation of the Soviet-Russian danger (about which Martin knew the least). I have made it clear to him that a German situation would mean a systematic Bolshevization of the whole of Europe and the end of the European cult (with the United States as helpers) and pointed out the naivety of the assumption that a peaceful detachment of the Soviet Russians by US troops could take place. Martin, on the other hand, continues to insist on the possibility that US troops could still occupy Central Europe before the Soviet Russians. Jokingly, he said that he himself would provide our protection in Prague in time. 2./ Despite his bias against Germany, I found Martin a certain open-mindedness for the representation of the Empire as the only possible authority in Europe. Arguments that the realm for this task does not look back on a sufficient experience or tradition, but that nations as well as people with their tasks awake, further references to the history of the construction of the British empire were shining for Martin. He even went so far as to acknowledge that the Germans are more dignified today than two years ago.