THE GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 122, sig. 110-3/62

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English Translation

- 2 - with Gauleiter Dr.Jury I note the following: Jn Brno are covered by the employment office in working persons about 1o8.ooo, of which in the armaments industry with the greatest war resistance 50.o0o. A respectable armament center would come to a halt - at a time when an immediate danger is not yet apparent. Evacuation of such an incapacitation would be contrary to the resistance of the Czech population and would not have to be enforced with the available forces. The evacuation would have a decisive negative influence on the attitude of the population, both in the Protectorate and in the surrounding regions. The evacuation of 290,000 people would also trigger a plethora of difficulties in transport, reception space, quarters, work and nutrition. In addition, the 50.ooo forces required by the commander of the fortress could not be held back in the event of an evacuation. It would also be of no use to promote the free-will emigration instead of the evacuation. Each pandering would be seen as a sign of an imminent inclusion and would unleash a regular escape. Incidentally, the same effect would have been the removal of the air protection rooms intended for the population in favour of military storage. On the other hand, there is the fact that Brno does not have any fortifications at the moment and that only a support point extension already requires six units. Thus, the military demands and conclusions attached to the seizure of "fortress" are without object until further notice. This applies in particular to the stockpiling. In summary, I stand with Gauleiter Jury on the point that the declaration of the city of Brno should be taken back to the fortress and instead Brno should only be expanded as a local base.