NĚMECKÉ STÁTNÍ MINISTERSTVO PRO ČECHY A MORAVU, PRAHA (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 122, sig. 110-3/62 Page 18 · 18 of 118
THE GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 122, sig. 110-3/62
English Translation
EV - 2 - with Gauleiter Dr.Jury, I note the following: Jn Brno is covered by the employment office about 1o8.o00 in working persons, of which in the defence industry with the greatest importance of war 50.Oo0. A respectable armaments centre would come to a standstill - at a time when an immediate danger is not yet apparent. Evacuation of such a scale would be contrary to the resistance of the Czech population and would not have to be enforced with the available forces. The evacuation would have a decisive negative influence on the attitude of the population, both in the Protectorate and in the surrounding regions. The evacuation of 290,000 people would also trigger a plethora of difficulties in transport, reception space, quarters, labor and nutrition. In addition, the 50.0oo forces required by the commander of the fortress could not be restrained in the event of an evacuation. It would also be of no use to promote the free-will emigration instead of the evacuation. Any promotion would be seen as a sign of an imminent inclusion and would unleash a regular escape. Incidentally, the same effect would also have the removal of the air protection rooms intended for the population in favour of military storage. On the other hand, the fact that Brno does not have any fortifications at the moment and only a support point extension takes six weeks. Thus, the military demands and conclusions attached to the seizure of "fortress" are without object until further notice. This applies in particular to the stockpiling. In summary, I stand with Gauleiter Jury on the point that the declaration of the city of Brno should be taken back to the fortress and instead Brno should only be expanded as a local base.