THE GERMAN STATE MINISTRY FOR CHECH AND MORAV, PRAGUE (1906) 1939 - 1945 (1965), inv. 1270, sig. 110-12/96

Page 112

English Translation

110.) b) Post-war Germany. I repeat very strongly that I consider for the best solution for Germany the fundamental return to its borders before the Minchen conference, perhaps with some changes indicated above. It would be the most starving mistake if Germany were to retain a single foot of land from its violent national gain. It would be a satisfaction for Hitler's Nazi politics, because it would prove that totalitarian antidemo-cratist violence is profitable. And if Hitler and his regime, too, disappeared forever, this expansion of the German territory would be too great a temptation for the d e d d dt e as soon as the lesson from this war was a little forgotten. On the contrary, the present and future German states must be "ad occulos" and once and for all be convinced that violence does not pay off and on the contrary leads to serious victims and concerns. I also add that the occupation of large parts of the Czechoslovak territory after the Munich dictation was violence, although a less bloody, but especially immoral one, therefore I find it natural that Germany and Hungary release their robbery from the year l938 as well as everything they later won; Deutsahland will therefore be forced to reumen Austria, which it seized by the violent "connection" in March l938, the same applies to the other attackers who are members of the axis today.